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Land efficiency in urban China is examined, using Tianjin as a case study, from the 
perspective of agricultural land conservation; reduction in energy use, conventional 
pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions; and human time savings. Issues addressed 
include increased scatter on the periphery, over-consumption of industrial land, over 
fiscal dependence on land sales, and loss of valuable agricultural and environmental 
services land. Policy implications discussed include the need for greater variation in 
urban densities (leveraging already high densities in urban China – one-third the global 
median), less broad-brush agricultural land conservation policies, higher floor area 
ratios near rapid transit stations, etc. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Increasing urban land use efficiency is a policy priority of the Chinese government as 
energy prices are expected to rise, population growth and rising food prices increase 
concern regarding domestic agricultural production, and China is participating in the 
global warming discourse.
1  
This study addresses the question of urban land use/transportation efficiency in China’s 
268 metropolitan areas.
2 Although the authors have studied land use dynamics in over 
20 of these metropolitan areas in considerable detail, this paper cites the Tianjin in 
particular.  
By urban land use efficiency we are referring to the energy, pollution, greenhouse gas 
emissions, and human time benefits/costs associated with patterns of land use in urban 
China and the existence and use of transportation systems that connect these land uses.  
1.2 Potential  benefits 
(i) Given the expected rise in energy costs and potential scarcity of petroleum-based 
fuels in the foreseeable future, energy savings from urban form efficiency are important. 
Perhaps 10-15 per cent of a Chinese city’s total energy consumption can be reduced 
directly through more integrated efficient land use and transportation systems. 
Additionally, building form/construction materials interact with land use to create 
additional potential energy savings. For example, high-density neighbourhoods are 
enabled by good accessibility making possible energy-efficient, highly livable, high-rise 
neighbourhoods. Since buildings consume approximately 45 per cent of energy in 
China, the potential for such gains is enormous if buildings are constructed to LEED 
standards, as proposed by the China Green Building Council. 
(ii) Related to energy savings are reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions and 
conventional pollutants, highly correlated with automobile use. The State of California, 
USA, recently introduced ambitious greenhouse-gas emissions legislation, which will 
reduce greenhouse-gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. The California state 
government intends 15 per cent of greenhouse gas emission reduction to result from 
‘smart growth’, i.e., urban land efficiency (The Economist 2007).  
(iii) In urban China, the economic cost of human time is rising due to rapid growth in 
personal incomes, thus very significant benefits to human well-being and urban 
economic product can be achieved through more efficient urban form, by enabling more 
efficient commuting and non-commuting travel. In addition, higher density clustering of 
                                                 
1  The world population is currently about 6.7 billion. It is expected that the global population will level 
off at approximately 9 billion this century.  
2  The 268 prefecture level cities are a rough approximation of the number of metropolitan systems in 
China.   2
specialized functions facilitates human transactions, a key driver of innovation and 
productivity. 
(iv) Infrastructure costs per housing or workplace unit, e.g., unit costs of water supply 
systems, are much lower if land is used efficiently.  
(v) China spends approximately 18 per cent of its GDP storing and moving goods. This 
is high compared with nations such as the United States where the comparable figure is 
8-9 per cent.
3 In part, logistics costs in China could be lowered through more efficient 
urban form. 
(vi) China, a mountainous country, is 14 per cent, or less, arable, (Fan 2006) meaning 
agricultural land is relatively scarce. Thus loss of agricultural land to urbanization is of 
particular concern given the country’s population is over 1.3 billion. This issue has been 
especially high-profile since 1997, when the extent of loss of fertile agricultural land in 
China became apparent through the release of time series remote-sensed images. 
China’s cities have tended to emerge in areas of highest agricultural productivity, thus 
although urban regions consume relatively little land, the land consumed is often of high 
agricultural value. (The urban built-up land of the 268 prefecture-level cities in China in 
2005 constituted only 0.26 per cent of China’s land area; officially defined city propers, 
which considerably over-bound actual built-up areas, constituted 6.2 per cent of China’s 
land area in 2005.) In adjacent to cities, the value of agricultural production may be as 
high as 3 million RMB per hectare. At present, China’s national target is to protect 121 
million hectares of agricultural land nation-wide in perpetuity (National Eleventh Five 
Year Development Plan).  
(vii) Efficient cities can more economically deliver housing that is both affordable and 
accessible to employment, schooling, and places of leisure. High-density development 
clustered around transit stations enables lower cost housing (land costs per unit are 
lower) and accessibility, a winning combination that can be difficult to achieve in fast-
growing developing metropolitan regions.
4  
2  Defining and analyzing land use efficiency in China 
2.1  Urban land consumption: trend analysis 
Chinese cities are among the lowest consumers of urban land per capita even when 
compared to other Asian cities – only India has denser cities. The average land 
consumption in the largest Chinese cities is about 40m
2 per person, less than 1/3 of the 
median world consumption.  
                                                 
3  The comparison is rough. China’s economy is obviously more dependent on manufacturing, which is 
associated with high logistics costs. On the other hand, the consumption-driven US economy is highly 
dependent on intricate urban distribution systems. 
4  Higher floor area ratios, other factors being constant, reduce the land costs of housing, at least until 
lost floor area to elevator systems negates the benefits of increased height.   3
One of the Chinese government’s main urban policy objectives in the 1980s and 1990s 
was to increase the living floor area per person. At the beginning of the 1980s the living 
floor area per person in Chinese cities was extremely low, for most large cities varying 
between 4 to 6 m
2 per person. In Tianjin in 1988 the average living floor space per 
person in the city proper had reached approximately 6.5 m
2 per person. In 2000 the 
living floor space was 19.1 m
2 per person and it has further increased to 25 m
2 per 
person in 2005 (Tianjin 2006 Basic Facts). 
The average residential FAR (floor area ratio) in Tianjin is estimated to have been 
around 1.6 in 2000, a significant increase of 88 per cent over 1988, but not sufficient to 
compensate for the exceptional increase in floor space per person. As the floor area per 
person increased by 194 per cent during the same period (1988-2000) the faster increase 
in the area of residential land relative to the increase in population is neither surprising 
nor a sign of waste. In fact Tianjin city has been using land more intensively (higher 
FAR) during this period. In other words, Tianjin was becoming more dense in terms of 
floor space, but less dense in terms of population, while delivering a substantial increase 
in the quality of life.  
The same is true for commercial area and administrative, business and professional 
services: the floor space per employee and per customer increased over the years 
because of the spectacular development of the economy and its diversification into new 
service sectors, such as real estate brokers, commercial banks, large department stores, 
advertising and marketing firms, lawyers, accountants, and management consulting 
firms. While the FARs of non-residential areas increased spectacularly, especially for 
office and commercial buildings, they did not increase sufficiently to maintain parity 
between population increase and urban land increase.  
3  China’s urban land allocation system 
In China, market forces play a larger role on the demand side than the supply side in 
allocating land under current city-building policy frameworks.  
3.1  Supply side dynamics 
The vast majority of land released by urban local governments (the primary land 
market) is still not the subject of open lowest-bidder auction processes, despite 
administrative regulations. (All land in China is the property of the state, however, 
leases are allocated for as long as 70 years.) 
Until recently, virtually all industrial land was allocated by negotiation, often at a 
fraction of market value. Other land in China (residential, commercial, mixed) is 
allocated through both auction and bidding processes. Auction processes result in land 
being allocated to the highest bidder – market value. However, much land, particularly 
larger parcels, is allocated through bidding. Bidding involves a number of invited 
developers putting forward competing proposals (in terms of FAR, design guidelines, 
land use and floor space mix, etc.) to develop a particular plot based on government 
guidelines for the site (which vary widely in detail and scope from site to site and 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction). The rationale for bidding processes is to ensure high quality 
urban design, delivery of catalytic facilities, etc., in certain critical locations.   4
International experience indicates that the use of this mechanism is not necessarily 
negative, if used selectively.  
Property on land allocated through the primary market may be resold (technically on-
leased), creating a secondary market in property similar to that seen in Western 
countries, characterized by higher churn for residential properties. Since local 
governments can only sell land once, it is a one-off effect in terms of leasing revenue, 
which is usually paid to local jurisdictions up-front. Since land lease revenues account 
for approximately 25 per cent of the fiscal revenue of a typical Chinese urban 
jurisdiction, fiscal sustainability implications are obvious. (Land lease revenues are 
regarded as ‘off budget’ in Chinese urban jurisdictions.) 
At the national level, certain geographic areas are given preference, such as access to 
credit for urban investment and increased land quotas, at different times, e.g., 
Chongqing from 1999 under the ‘Go West’ programme, Beijing –Tianjin - Binhai from 
2006 onwards.  
Below the national level, administrative measures, including land quotas and rural-
urban land conversion criteria (protected basic agricultural land), are established by the 
Ministry of Land and Resources (prior to 1998, a Special Bureau), and are enforced (to 
varying degrees) down the vertical hierarchy of governments. In terms of urban land use 
efficiency, land quotas are becoming less important because local jurisdictions, 
especially municipalities, have learned to ‘game’ them, e.g., indicating compensating 
land has been set aside (‘traded’) in a remote area to justify urban development beyond 
a given quota. However, protected basic agricultural land regulations (governing rural-
urban land conversion), initially introduced in 1994, are increasingly enforced by the 
national government. Such monitoring has been made easier and more effective by 
increased availability of inexpensive remote-sensed images. For example, in the case of 
Tianjin Municipality, 4,456 km
2 was designated as Basic Protected Agricultural Land in 
2005, and the Municipality intends to protect virtually all of this land into the 
foreseeable future (2020). This does not mean that Tianjin cannot expand at planned 
densities, there is ample land in the ‘other’ category, e.g., low fertility land, unprotected 
forest, that can be developed until 2079. In many local jurisdictions it is unclear whether 
protected basic agricultural land has actually been mapped and tied to specific locations 
or whether it is purely ‘abstract’ land. Attempts by the researchers to access such maps 
in a number of Chinese municipalities were unsuccessful, although Tianjin Municipality 
indicates that such a map exists. 
Local governments (with municipal governments exerting the most power, especially in 
West China where counties are relatively weaker) produce urban master plans that 
indicate future land use, and influence the spatial allocation of public investment. 
However, urban master plans often have limited impact in terms of real on-the-ground 
development. For example, a Ford Foundation and World Bank sponsored study of the 
relationship between Chengdu Municipality’s actual physical expansion in the 1990s 
and early 21
st century and the Municipality’s Master Plan, using time series remote-
sensed imagery, showed an almost inverse relationship between the ‘rational’ plan 
which advocated development to the east where land was less agriculturally fertile and 
available, and actual large-scale development to the south-west and north-west 
(Schneider et al. 2003). To the south-west, urban expansion was driven by the new 
international airport; to the north-west, by the national Hi-Tech New Park and 
Dujiangyan tourism areas (Schneider et al. 2005).   5
3.2  Demand side dynamics 
Changes in demand preferences for land and buildings will continue to be a significant 
driver affecting urban form and land use efficiency in China. In the case of demand, the 
market is king. 
Given that China’s urban economy is on the verge of major structural change (toward a 
greater reliance on services and higher-value manufacturing), demand and locational 
preferences for floor space for manufacturing and services will change significantly. 
Office space is becoming more important, and workers are demanding larger per capita 
work space. Similarly, the growth of the hospitality industry and an affluent consumer 
class is creating demand for new spaces, e.g., hotels, convention centers, mixed use 
shopping/entertainment complexes.  
Continued demand for more residential floor space is expected, the product of aggregate 
demand (driven by rural - urban migration and envelopment of surrounding 
communities) and demand for larger residential living spaces. Smaller household size is 
contributing to growth in demand for housing units in excess of urban population 
growth. 
The third important variable affecting demand is access. In this regard, supply of 
different modes of transport in different locations obviously interacts with demand.
5 On 
the one hand, increased motorization would appear to provide consumers with more 
locational choice, making them more footloose within the metropolitan region. On the 
other hand, increased road congestion and rapidly increased value of human time (both 
economically and psychologically) is making access more important. Demand for 
premium access is likely to continue to increase rapidly. While easy access to peripheral 
locations (e.g., through ring roads and radial expressways) would likely increase green-
field (and rural collective) land consumption, reduced congestion in core city areas, 
particularly through development of mass transit, is likely to have the opposite effect.  
An important fourth factor is amenity. As the population of more affluent socio-
economic classes increase rapidly in Chinese cities, housing is becoming more than a 
commodity. Increasingly, consumers are demanding on-site, or nearby, social and 
recreational facilities, good schools (especially middle schools), and sites with views or 
water front locations (the latter considered auspicious in China). The demand for 
amenity is seen most clearly in purchase of second housing units. In amenity cities such 
as Haikou (Hainan), Qingdao, Kunming, Lijiang, Xiamen, etc., 20 per cent or more of 
housing unit sales are for second properties. This inter-city competition is mirrored 
within cities, increasingly since 1980 Chinese cities have ‘high end’ and ‘low end’ 
neighbourhoods, although the phenomenon is not entirely new. For example, Chengdu’s 
east side has, for a century, had less status than its west side. 
A fifth major factor affecting demand is the behavior of land developers. In a ‘new’ 
housing market such as China, developers play an important role, through 
                                                 
5  Important interacting supply and demand variables in this regard include the balance between public 
and private transportation modes; changing preferences for private vehicle use between commuting 
and leisure activities; and existing use of, and future plans, for expressways and mass public transit 
systems.   6
advertisements, model suites, etc., in shaping demand preferences. Cosmopolitan 
developers, including foreign developers, introduce international ‘best practices,’ and 
larger developers generally work on larger sites resulting in significantly different urban 
communities in terms of densities, on-site uses, activies, and services, and quality of 
design. New products are introduced, e.g., live-work loft developments, vertical 
communities, changing demand preferences.  
4  Land use efficiency and the internal spatial structure of Chinese cities 
4.1  The importance of FAR regulations in shaping an efficient spatial structure 
FAR values have a direct impact on the total area of land a city occupies. In Chinese 
cities, as in most of the world, the permissible values for FAR are regulated. In China, 
FARs are identified at the ‘detail planning area’ scale, with subsequent modification 
often occurring at the site scale when land is leased to a developer. By establishing an 
upper limit on the total floor area that can be built on a lot, FAR regulations are in 
shaping the spatial structure of a city.  
In market economies, FAR values are usually set high in areas of high demand and low 
in areas where demand for land is lower. For instance in New York City, the FAR value 
varies from18 at Battery Park to 0.4 in the suburbs. An overall plan shows prospective 
developers the FAR allowed in various parts of the city.  
In China, by contrast, master plans show projected land use, but FAR values are not 
normally part of the master plan documentation. The regulated FAR values are only 
shown in ‘detail plans’ encompassing approximately 10 blocks. For most Chinese cities, 
the regulated FAR values for new housing are mostly uniform and vary between 1 and 
2, whatever the location.  
Analysis of a few blocks in Tianjin shows a regulatory residential FAR value of 1.5, 
despite the site being close to the central business district (CBD), and on the planned 
path of a metro line. This low FAR value indicates that strategic spatial policy, 
reflecting efficiency objectives, is not manifest in the use of FARs in Tianjin.  
The long range consequence of this sub-optimal use of FARs is: (i) an increase in land 
consumption, (ii) a less efficient transit system, and (iii) higher housing prices, because 
more land is required per housing units in areas with a low FAR. 
4.2  The fragmentation of the built-up area at the fringe of urbanization 
While the density of Chinese cities is high by world standards, the fragmentation of the 
built-up area at the urban fringe greatly reduces the benefits delivered by high density in 
the core area. 
In Tianjin, relatively high-density areas are developed in a discontinuous manner, 
leaving large areas of vacant or cultivated land within the built-up area. These un-
urbanized enclaves are costly for the city. Infrastructure networks, such as roads, water, 
sewer, telecommunications, and transport have to bypass these areas and as a result 
become more costly per hectare served.   7
The result of sample land use surveys conducted in suburban areas in Chengdu, Tianjin, 
and Zhengzhou by Alain Bertaud shows that on average about 34 per cent of the land 
within existing ring roads remain under agricultural use while urban development 
continues to expand in a leapfrog manner, much farther away from the city center (see 
Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Proportion of land under agricultural use enclaved within urban area  
in Tianjin, Chengdu, and Zhengzhou 
Agricultural enclaves in metropolitan areas served by urban Infrastructure in Tianjin, Chengdu, and Zhengzhou 
City 
% of agricultural 
use 
Total area of sample 
(km2) Location 
Tianjin  27  22  Northern area inside 3rd ring road 
Chengdu 32  70  North West area between 2nd and 3rd ring 
road 
Zhengzhou 41  49  Western area within master plan limit 1995-
2010 
Source: Authors. 
Current systems (i) to protect basic agricultural land and (ii) land conversion quotas 
have encouraged urban fragmentation at the fringe. Mechanisms to protect basic 
agricultural land were imposed by the central government in 1994 to respond to a 
widespread perception that municipal governments were consuming too much 
cultivated land. Land quotas, a hierarchical system limiting the aggregate amount of 
land that can be converted to urban uses over a five year period were imposed in 1988, 
because the national government determined that cities were developing land in excess 
of what was justified by economic development. The distortions between the 
compensation price paid by municipalities for undeveloped land and the sale price of 
land use rights generate large profits. Accordingly, municipal governments, who have a 
monopoly on land development, have a strong incentive to develop land to generate 
municipal revenue.  
To prevent this apparent waste of land and infrastructure, the national government chose 
to impose protected basic agricultural land and land quota mechanisms to slow down 
land development at the periphery of cities rather than to remove the land price, high 
short-run municipal revenue generation benefits, and interest rate distortions which 
created the incentive to low density leapfrogging development on the periphery of 
Chinese cities in the first place. Thus agricultural land mechanisms (gaining in 
importance) and land quota legislation (declining in importance) did not remove the 
incentives to develop land in a financially profitable but uneconomical way. These 
mechanisms to limit conversion of certain land to urban uses have serious negative side 
effects, in particular, they distort urban shape.  
Because the areas currently occupied by existing ‘collective’ villages and Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs) are not considered agricultural land (and thus not subject to 
land quotas or protected as basic agricultural land) there is a strong incentive to 
redevelop the land occupied by villages and TVEs while avoiding the agricultural land   8
in between. This process results in leapfrogging. In late 2008, holders of rural 
(collective) land were granted considerably enhanced property rights by the national 
government. It is likely that this will encourage leapfrogging development, rural 
landholders will gain a larger share of financial rewards from such land conversion.  
4.3  Fragmentation and new primary infrastructure 
Urban master plans in China usually include a large programme of primary 
infrastructure investments and project-scale land use, e.g., industrial parks, compact in 
shape, aligned with the infrastructure investments. The record of implementing primary 
infrastructure ahead of development in China is generally good, in contrast to many 
cities in Asia where urban development is often far ahead of infrastructure investment. 
However, the difficulties in converting agricultural land that have been projected for 
urban use in the master plan leads to an under use of already built infrastructure as 
discussed above. 
The economic costs of the urban land fragmentation caused by the land conversion 
system are threefold: (i) Additional infrastructure costs to land users. (ii) Additional 
transport costs, and associated energy consumption and pollution, resulting from 
enclaves and leapfrogging. And (iii) less efficient enclaved agriculture. 
4.4  Overdevelopment of industrial land 
In Chinese cities the proportion of land devoted to industries is around 26 per cent of the 
built-up area. Tianjin with 21.7 per cent of land in industrial use is slightly below the 
Chinese cities mean, but still much above cities in market economies. Seoul uses 6.9 per 
cent of its built land for industries, Hong Kong 5.4 per cent and New York City only 4 
per cent.
6 
This differential is partially explained by historical factors. In a command economy, the 
case in China prior to 1980, land for industries was heavily subsidized as industrial 
production was considered to be a privileged component of the economy, while 
commerce and services were thought to be of minor economic importance. Prior to the 
1980s industrial land was allocated administratively to state enterprises in industrial 
belts very close to, or in, the city center. Since the reforms of the early 1980s, large 
industrial zones (economic and technological development zones [ETDZs] and high 
technology developments zones [HTDZs]) have become the norm, attracting dispersed 
state enterprises and private foreign and domestic firms. However, until 2005, industrial 
land was usually leased at a negotiated price much lower than the auction price bid for 
residential land, both in the case of free-standing enterprises (not in industrial zones) 
and in the case of land leased in industrial zones. Most industrial zones are managed by 
semi-autonomous local government authorities, usually established by municipalities, 
and thus land cost is zero or its transfer negotiated at a low rate. However, even private 
industrial zones and firms negotiated land purchase at very low cost. It was not until 
2005 that auctions began to be used to lease land use rights for industrial land, although 
under pricing of industrial land is still the norm. As expected, land sold below market 
                                                 
6  Data source: Authors. We recognize that Hong Kong and New York are now post-industrial cities; 
nevertheless, the differences are too large to explain through economic structure differences. Seoul is 
the most analogous city to the Chinese cities in terms of industrial structure.   9
price, and often below even infrastructure development cost, was consumed in larger 
quantities than land obtained through competitive bidding. The large proportion of 
industrial land found in Chinese cities reflects past practices; it will take a long time to 
reduce it to more normal proportions. 
The excessive consumption of industrial land in Chinese cities is a dead weight on the 
economy. It extends the built-up boundaries beyond what would be normally needed, it 
also artificially expands infrastructure and transport networks. In addition, large 
industrial areas inside cities are blocking normal urban extensions, as it is the case in 
Zhengzhou where the extensive industrial areas along the railway lines are making 
expansion in the North West area of the city difficult, decreasing land values.  
4.5  The relationships between urban spatial structure and transport efficiency 
High residential densities and the concentration of employment in few areas, nodes, are 
consistent with a high use of transit, while low density and the dispersion of 
employment are more consistent with individual modes of transport. The high density of 
Chinese cities precludes the use of the individual car as the main mode of transport in 
the foreseeable future. While densities have been slightly decreasing in the central part 
of Chinese cities in the past 20 years, their density will remain more than an order of 
magnitude higher than European or American cities where individual cars are the main 
transport mode. The national government’s concern over land conversion at the fringe 
of cities will likely lead to action that will ensure that densities stay high in the future, 
even in suburban and peri-urban areas. 
High average density is not enough to allow the efficient operation of transit. The 
spatial distribution of densities needs to reflect the accessibility created by the transit 
network. The regulation of FARs in particular is crucial to insure that costly transit 
investments are fully coordinated with land use.  
5  Key issues: potential for improvement 
5.1 De-densification/loss of smart urbanism 
There is wide variance in levels and trends in density in China among regions. Virtually 
all Chinese cities are de-densifying with a few notable exceptions such as Wuhan. 
However, urban regions are de-densifying at widely different rates. For example, in the 
case of Tianjin, planned densities in the core city (within the third ring road) will 
actually increase from 12,647 persons per km
2 to 13,824. However, outside this area, 
including Binhai New Area, urban densities will only be 6,684. In other words, densities 
in new areas will be approximately half (53 per cent) those prevailing in the existing 
built-up area – a significant loss of density.  
New towns on the edge of existing cities can be a key contributor to de-densification. 
These ‘start again’ cities are often motivated by preferences for modernity, and/or the 
fact that it is less expensive to build new towns than redevelop existing run-down urban 
fabric. In the case of new towns, densities vary greatly - they are not necessarily major 
contributors to de-densification. In some cases new towns are being built that may be 
unnecessary and may never achieve populations and forecast densities because they are   10
based on faulty demographic forecasts. For example, in Harbin, a slow growing 
northeastern city, the new town being constructed across the Songhua River is probably 
too large given that city’s very slow economic growth. New towns should have a strong 
demographic, economic, and environmental rationale before being built and should be 
built at close to prevailing densities, or at least the 10,000 persons per km
2 prevailing 
standard of the Ministry of Construction.  
5.2  Potential for infill 
Some experts argue that much of the remote-sensed analysis of Chinese metropolitan 
areas in the late 1990s over-counted urban land conversion because it liberally defined 
built-up edges of cities and classified all land within these edges as urbanized. They 
argue that considerable infill land exists in China, which could absorb large populations. 
An international comparative study of urbanization in the 1990s (1990-2000 time series 
analysis) by Angel et al. (2005), commissioned by the World Bank, pointed to the 
importance of infilling as a means to reduce urban-rural land conversion world-wide. 
Images of Chinese cities, e.g., Guangzhou, over the 1990-2000 period indicated 
considerable leapfrogging, and thus potential for infilling. Worldwide, approximately 8 
per cent of land within ‘built-up’ urban areas is vacant and available for infilling 
(Sheppard 2010). If all 660 Chinese cities are included in the sample, about 15 per cent 
of land in China’s built-up areas is vacant according to Fan (Fan 2006). However, if we 
limit our sample to the 286 prefecture level cities, the figure is approximately 10 per 
cent, or less. 
Based on our research, in the case of Tianjin, available land totals 28.4 km
2.
 7 This 
represents 9.7 per cent of the area within the third ring road (which approximates the 
built-up area). In other words infill potential is close to the world norm, and not 
particularly extensive. If the 28.4 km
2 of vacant land within the third ring road were 
developed at 2020 densities (13,824 per km
2), the land could accommodate 392,600 
people. However, if these infill sites were strategically developed as high-density nodes 
at the highest prevailing densities (47,000 per km
2 found in Heping District), they could 
accommodate 1,335,000 people. 
In sum, based on our analysis of Tianjin, and other Chinese cities, if we analyze 
potential infill land available within core cities (roughly corresponding to contiguously 
built-up edges) in China, the percentage of land available for infilling tends to be close 
to global norms. But infill land is very important in China for other reasons, it is often 
in prime locations (industrial work units were often located near the center of the city) 
suitable for high-density transit-related development. Larger sites, e.g., abandoned 
large-scale industrial sites are of sufficient scale to be used for urban sub-centers that 
can dramatically improve overall land efficiency and catalyze redevelopment of urban 
cores. In sum, infill sites in China can and should play a catalytic role in reconfiguring 
and retrofitting land. Many infill sites, especially larger ones, should not be viewed as 
just another source of land but as special sites capable of playing a catalytic role. 
                                                 
7  Potential infill land consists of: (i) vacant land: never built up or already cleared, (ii) severely 
substandard housing sites to be demolished, (iii) abandoned/dispersed industrial sites or to be 
abandoned/dispersed industrial sites.    11
5.3  Scatter on the periphery 
Scattered peripheral development is a major problem in virtually all Chinese urban 
regions, but particularly a problem in economically successful coastal metropolitan and 
megapolitan regions, such as Hangzhou, and the Pearl River Delta megapolitan region, 
that have attracted large amounts of capital, particularly, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in manufacturing.  
Chinese cities tend to be built out contiguously to an often highly visible perimeter, 
usually reached around 1990, then scatter sets in. The key question is whether this 
scatter is temporary, i.e., will infilling result in eventual contiguous development or is 
this two ring pattern becoming the norm.  
Several factors tend to be encouraging peripheral scatter as the new norm: 
(i) The Protection of Basic Agricultural Land law of 1994 has mechanistically blocked 
development of relatively small, cultivated areas to urbanization. 
(ii) Local governments below the municipal level are often pro-development, driven by 
fiscal incentives, encouraging leapfrog development, especially along expressways.  
(iii) As noted, rural collective village areas are targeted for large-scale peri-urban 
development around cities. Most undeveloped land on the periphery is still controlled 
by rural collectives. Since such villages are by definition not protected agricultural land, 
they are often targeted by local governments (and indirectly private developers) for 
higher density urbanization. (Such conversion processes usually increase densities by 
three to four times, relative to traditional village development.) The second reason for 
such targeting is that conversion of such land to urban land uses does not count against 
the land quota, they are already considered urban.  
(iv) Rapid Motorization and Expressway Construction. As the middle class becomes 
motorized, they are able to take advantage of inter-city expressways emanating from 
existing metropolitan regions. At first access to the city from remote peripheral 
locations seems easy by private vehicle, until others buy into leapfrogging 
developments creating road congestion. 
In sum, two ring cities are emerging in China. The (i) inner ring, usually the product of 
pre 1990 urbanization, is contiguously built up, to high densities, with little vacant land 
available for infilling while the (ii) outer ring can be described as scattered and 
leapfrogging. 
5.4  Lack of variance in FARs/nodality 
As noted, Chinese cities are characterized by relatively uniform FARs. The relative 
uniformity of FARs, densities, and employment distribution in Chinese cities is not a 
desirable spatial pattern in that mass transit systems operate much more efficiently if 
cities contain several peaks (of different levels) of density in terms of both residences 
and employment. If rapid transit networks join these peaks they generate high 
accessibility throughout the city and benefit from much higher ridership. For benefits to 
accrue, it is not necessary to have housing-jobs fit within nodes, travel between nodes is 
highly efficient. Benefits of nodality include:   12
(i) Dramatically improved economics of mass transit. If land use and mass transit are 
optimally aligned, mass transit systems can be close to self-financing, i.e., they require 
very little public expenditure.  
(ii) Lower unit costs of infrastructure. Densely clustered development (even if 
surrounded by green or public space) lowers unit costs of infrastructure, especially for 
network based systems, such as sewerage. Infrastructure experts estimate cost savings 
through compact development in the order of 33 per cent; our analysis indicates even 
greater possible savings, approximately 55 per cent.  
(iii) Well-designed nodal communities create vital environments for leisure and high 
transaction office environments, conducive to happiness, productivity and innovation.  
(iv) Nodality increases access, which reduces wasted human time in travel. 
(v) Nodality saves energy by increasing the percentage of trips on energy-efficient 
modes (particularly rail, but also bus rapid transit [BRT] etc.), and by enabling energy 
efficient dense buildings, etc. 
(vi) Nodality creates the possibility of increased affordable housing supply, particularly 
in nodes away from the CBD - where land is less expensive, but accessibility still high. 
High densities reduce the land cost per metre of floor space.  
5.5  Alignment between transport and land use planning/investment systems 
In Chinese cities, there is often insufficient integration of land use and transportation 
planning. A clear example is the new CBD planned for Wuhan. Although the core of the 
planned CBD is completely pedestrian oriented, the major subway intersection in the 
city is located over a kilometre to the east of the CBD’s peak value intersection. This 
situation, typical of Chinese cities, is the product of: (i) With rare exceptions, Chinese 
mass transit systems are financed and operated as public facilities, thus institutionally 
there is little incentive for the organizations responsible for their construction and 
operation to maximize ridership or generate operating financial surpluses. (ii) In most 
municipalities the transportation and land use planning agencies are separate, with co-
ordination between them limited. And (iii) there may be a lack of awareness concerning 
the enormous benefits in terms of both ridership and land use efficiency through 
integration of the two systems. 
5.6  Loss of fertile agricultural land 
Loss of fertile agricultural land has driven much of the concern in regard to urban land 
efficiency in China. It is commendable that the issue has received such a high profile, 
but the greatest gains to the economy and environment from improved urban land 
efficiency may not be related to protection of fertile agricultural land but be expressed 
in reduced energy costs, emissions, and lost human time through more efficient urban 
form, greater variance in FARs/densities, and alignment of mass transit stations and 
land use.  
We do not see a tradeoff before mid-century (after which urbanization in China will 
slow down dramatically) between protecting basic agricultural land and expanding cities 
at a density of approximately 10,000 persons per kilometre. For example, even in the 
heavily urbanized coastal Tianjin metropolitan area, our analysis indicates that all   13
protected land can be preserved and urban areas expanded at densities even below 
10,000 per km
2.  
The real issue is not whether protected land can be preserved consistent with China’s 
forecast urban growth and national targets for aggregate protected agricultural land but 
how it should be done. The Protected Agricultural Land Law of 1994 is vague and 
differentially implemented. Enough technical support does not seem to have been 
allocated to make this process effective at the local level. There are several issues: (i) 
Protected land is defined on the basis of currently cultivated land rather than agricultural 
potential.
8 (This issue may not be as serious as it appears, because over thousands of 
years of agricultural cultivation in China, the best land has almost certainly been 
identified by farmers.) (ii) It appears that most municipalities (with notable exceptions 
such as Tianjin) have not prepared basic protected agricultural land maps. Thus, de 
facto, existing agricultural plots are assumed to be what should be protected. Most 
municipalities seem to have a numerical quota for protection of agricultural land, but it 
has not been mapped. This creates ambiguity for all actors involved in land allocation 
and development. (iii) The system seems to be enforced either mechanistically in some 
jurisdictions (all cultivated land is to be avoided) or in an extremely flexible way in 
others, because no maps or hard criteria exist.  
What is needed are mechanisms to ‘smooth out’ agricultural protection boundaries and 
urban areas – to the benefit of both. This could take the form of growth boundaries or 
service boundaries, as practiced in many jurisdictions worldwide, e.g., in Canada, 
Quito, European states such as Germany and the Netherlands, and US states such as 
Maryland and Oregon. If carefully implemented, such an approach could actually 
increase the amount of agricultural land and environmental services land (equally 
important in and around cities) protected, e.g., by protecting more Class 2 agricultural 
land, increasing densities on the periphery, and by avoiding zones of high fertility and 
important environmental services use all together. It would not be inexpensive to 
implement such a system, but the gains (cost : benefit ratio) would be enormous.  
In sum, China is not in danger of losing adequate levels of prime agricultural land, in 
aggregate, if forecast urbanization occurs, at planned densities, provided reasonable 
measures are taken to steer urbanization away from areas of high agricultural 
productivity. However, the present system to protect basic agricultural land is under-
developed, inefficient, not transparent, and exerts costs on both the agricultural and 
urban users of land. Investment in designing and implementing a ‘less broad brush’ 
system would pay high dividends given the extreme importance of the issue to Chinese 
society and economy, and the substantial economic and environmental implications. 
5.7  Lack of fiscal sustainability and fiscal biases on land use 
Municipalities in China depend on land lease revenues for approximately 25 per cent of 
their revenues, sometimes considerably more. Since this is a one-off effect, i.e., land 
that is leased by governments eventually finds its way into the secondary market, 
                                                 
8  This is different from international practice, e.g., the use of the Canada Land Inventory to enforce the 
British Columbia agricultural land reserve law. In that Canadian Province, as elsewhere in much of 
the world, Class 1 agricultural land is preserved rather than cultivated land per se.   14
alternative modes to generate large scale local urban revenues, e.g., property taxes, will 
eventually (before mid-century) need to be devised.  
The dependency on land lease revenue (almost invariably paid up front) encourages 
governments to release more land than may be optimal. The alternative strategy of local 
governments would be to hold out for higher prices by releasing less, such as in Hong 
Kong. Net revenue might remain the same, with less land released, that would be 
developed at higher intensity. Excess release of land encourages de-densification, lack 
of nodality, etc. The lack of property tax or an idle land tax (land is supposed to be 
developed within two years of release in China, but there are many ways around this 
requirement) reinforces this dynamic.  
From a fiscal perspective, local governments favour manufacturing activity/land use 
(which generates shared corporate tax, excise tax) over residential and other uses. Also, 
importantly, since local officials are judged to a significant extent on GDP growth in 
their jurisdictions local officials chase manufacturing because of its ability to generate 
GDP growth. As a result, industrial land (economic zones) proliferate in Chinese urban 
regions and are found in virtually every jurisdiction within the municipality, often to the 
detriment of land use and economic efficiency (impeding cluster development, 
inefficient commuting, higher logistics costs) and amenity (juxtaposition of industrial 
and residential land uses). This issue is discussed in more detail in a World Bank/Cities 
Alliances report by Webster, Cai and Maneepong (Webster et al. 2006).  
6 Policy  implications 
6.1 A major cause of urban land use inefficiency in China is that most land is not priced 
at market value. Financial incentives, which encourage over-release of land by 
municipalities should be reduced, in particular the current off-budget importance of land 
lease revenues. Using market prices for farmer and TVE land expropriation, which 
would make the cost to municipalities of land purchase on the fringe higher, and using a 
market rate of interest for financing infrastructure construction would remove much of 
the financial incentive to convert more land than necessary.  
6.2 Chinese municipalities should consider introducing growth boundaries or service 
boundaries to address the problem of scattered peripheral growth. Common sense 
should be applied in protecting basic farm land, with some high fertility agricultural 
land sacrificed to create dense peripheral development, utilizing efficient spatial 
patterns, in particular, necklace development (TOD nodes along corridors). At the same 
time, in vectors of high agricultural land fertility, farmland protection should be given 
preference. Growth boundaries would need to be reviewed regularly (at least every five 
years) and would not necessarily be limited to the contiguous city, that is, they should 
also be drawn around outlying satellite cities, major developed patches, etc.  
6.3 To implement the above, the national government should develop a standardized 
system for identifying high fertility farmland.  
6.4 Chinese cities, through their urban planning, including spatial distribution of FARs, 
should encourage development of a hierarchy of nodes.    15
6.5 Large metropolitan areas should accelerate development of mass transit systems, 
aligned with future land use. Such systems should involve innovative finance, and 
possibly full or partial private ownership so that transit system operators will have an 
incentive to align with employment and residential patterns to generate increased 
revenues, and possibly make a profit.  
6.6 Auctioning industrial land should reduce the problem of over-consumption of 
industrial land in the long run. 
6.7 Two interacting factors are making it increasingly more difficult for the public 
sector to redevelop areas in need of urban renewal. One is the strengthening of urban 
property rights based on changes to the Chinese Constitution in 2007. The other is the 
informal development of civil society, e.g., neighbourhood preservation groups, a 
movement that has been gaining speed over the last 5 years.  
The increase in property rights and development of neighbourhood organization is 
obviously desirable. It will enable neighbourhoods to take more responsibility for their 
own development. However, the situation that is emerging increasingly resembles the 
debate over eminent domain in the United States, i.e., limits on the right of the state to 
expropriate land for certain types of public uses under a redevelopment rationale.  
Given the changed context affecting urban redevelopment, new mechanisms need to be 
initiated in China such as land readjustment and possibly even direct sale of property by 
existing apartment residents to developers to enable win-win situations to develop, 
freeing land for redevelopment. In other words, in areas in need of redevelopment, the 
benefits to present residents and businesses to voluntarily sell their land need to be 
increased. Land readjustment and direct sales to developers, which is occurring 
informally in some parts of China, e.g., the northwest of Beijing peri-urban area, is such 
a mechanism.  
6.8 As redevelopment of existing communities becomes more difficult, more pressure 
will be placed on development of brown field sites, i.e., former industrial sites. Such 
sites are abundant in urban China because industry was located in core cities between 
1949 and 1980. Planting (greening) of old demolished industrial sites is mistaken for 
environmental mitigation of old industrial sites in some Chinese urban areas. Clear 
brown field redevelopment guidelines and mechanisms are needed.
9 
6.9 Land quotas could be made obsolete if: (i) Most land is released through auctions 
and price competitive bidding. (ii) Local governments constrain the release of land to 
prevent land from being under-priced. (iii) Basic agricultural land is protected through 
growth boundaries or similar mechanisms. And (iv) developers receive permission to 
build only after land is serviced and pay for utility services (impact fees), thereby 
discouraging leapfrogging. 
6.10 There should be much greater variance in FARs. Higher FARs (or no FARs) in 
areas with high accessibility will enable mass transit infrastructure to be self-financing 
at least in terms of operating costs. Overall urban plans should (i) identify indicative 
                                                 
9  Some international practice, such as the US superfund system, is probably not appropriate for China at 
its current stage of development.   16
FARs, (ii) be based on policies linking FAR values to accessibility in different areas of 
the metropolitan zone, (iii) include current and projected net and gross average FARs
10 
to be calculated at the sub-district level. 
6.11 Awareness needs to be raised among government officials, developers, and 
property consumers regarding the value of access.  
6.12 Given the economic value of land in China, green space planning should 
emphasize linear parks, which maximize perimeter, and thus household access to parks. 
Green belts should be avoided as they increase commuting costs by forcing developers 
and commuters to skip over the green belt. On the other hand, green wedges, as in 
Chengdu’s and Wuhan’s new urban plans, which follow ecological systems, e.g., river 
valleys into urban areas, are superior both in land use efficiency and ecological terms.  
6.13 Awareness of the high quality of life achievable at high densities should be spread 
to city-building officials throughout China. For example, a residential development with 
an FAR of 5 with recreational facilities, schools, small parks (inside and outside high-
rises), convenience stores, restaurants, medical clinics, etc., offers a much higher quality 
of life than a walk-up apartment development from the 1970s with a FAR of 1.8. 
                                                 
10 The net FAR is the regulatory maximum FAR for lots auctioned to developers, the gross FAR is 
calculated by neighbourhood or even sub-district by adding all the area of residential and business 
floor space and dividing it by the entire area of the neighbourhood or sub-district. The gross FAR 
allows planners to calculate the amount of land, which is required per unit of floor space. The net FAR 
is a regulation, the gross FAR is a planning indicator.   17
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